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The Economy of Happiness. By JAMES MACKAYE. Pp. xv+533. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \$2.50.

Although the author starts by jauntily begging the question whether happiness is the end of life, thus avoiding consideration of the question whether something else is the end, and happiness an incident more or less parallel with the process which approaches the end or possibly constitutes the end, he has made a book that deserves serious attention. As a philosophy of life it leaves not a little to be desired. As a method of testing reasons for a certain range of the conduct of life, it offers much that is illuminating. However we may quarrel with any variation of hedonism, even in the most refined shapes of eudemonism, we may agree that for practical purposes happiness of some sort is at all events a sign that the conduct which secures it is making in the direction of the ultimate goal of life. Those who reject eudemonism as a final formulation of the ethical end may therefore unite with those who accept it, at least to the extent of assuming that, provided the concept happiness is safely defined, a surplus of happiness is presumably an index of a surplus of good in the conduct which results in the happiness. Accordingly a critique of happiness, and of the means by which it is gained, is to be welcomed by all who are not content with purely dogmatic morals.

The author is sure enough of himself to assume the onus of phrases which less virile thinkers might try to avoid. He frankly asserts that he proposes to offer a "cure-all" for failure to solve the problem of happiness.

The panacea I propose is *common-sense*, and I claim that it will cure all the ills which can be cured by any means whatever, and that it offers a complete solution of the problem of happiness. Moreover, I claim that there is no other solution, and that the many substitutes which have been proposed and practiced will prove in the future, as they have in the past, to be delusions. (P. 2.)

"Common sense" is defined as "a kind of sense susceptible of tests which are independent of the convictions of any man or assemblage of men" (p. 2). "Common sense, then, is concerned first with the *nature of intelligibility*, second with the *nature of truth*, and third with the *nature of utility*" (p. 3). Book I, entitled "The Principles of Common Sense," is a system of logic. In eighty-seven pages the method of inductive reasoning is epitomized, and thirteen pages are

devoted to moralizing upon the value of such reasoning. The third chapter analyzes "utility," and it reaches the conclusion: "*A right act is an act of maximum utility.* It is that act, among those at any moment possible, whose presumption of happiness is a maximum. *A wrong act is any alternative of a right act*" (p. 143). The freshness of treatment in these chapters almost disarms the inevitable criticism that one book would do enough if it should elucidate a problem of morals. It is rather excessive to undertake the rudimentary education of readers as well. It is not true that Book I contains nothing needed as an introduction to the other two books. It is true, however, that the class of readers who are likely to furnish a public for Books II and III might well have been trusted to supply for themselves the primary lessons in Book I. They would not all muster the needed preliminaries, to be sure, but the people who are interested in the problem of happiness are not likely to be in a state of mind to be schoolmastered in logic. On the other hand, people who are willing to be taught that they need to learn logic would hardly choose a treatise on happiness as the medium of instruction. On the whole, therefore, although Book I, considered on its own merits, is a thoroughly good piece of exposition, it was probably a mistake not to have begun the volume with Book II.

The subject of Book II is "The Technology of Happiness—Theoretical." The "factors of happiness" are said to be three: (1) the sentient being or happiness-producing agent; (2) the adaptation of said agent to his environment; (3) the number of said agents. A chapter is devoted to each of these factors. They are the work of a man who has broken away from dogmatic leading-strings, and is seeing with his own eyes, but has not yet seen enough to give his observations the weight of authority. They are acute, but they are not comprehensive except by assumption. The chapter on "Liberty" reminds one of a treatise on optics that might be written by a blind man with a turn for mathematics. While theoretically correct, the color of reality would be lacking.

Book III discusses "The Technology of Happiness—Applied." The chapter titles are: "The Social Mechanism," "Competition," "Private and Public Monopoly," "Pantocracy," and "The Next Step." The impression which this part of the book makes upon the sociologist is that it is a brief which deserves respectful treatment, but it is in many ways premature. No permanent contribution to the theory of ethics, either on the pure or the technological side, is

likely to be made without more thorough acquaintance with analysis of the social process than this book indicates. Meanwhile the volume seems to be the work of a man who has not stopped learning, and who is likely to use the clues in the present argument to good purpose in further study of social problems. He is well entitled to a hearing. Indeed, it would be a mistake for anyone capable of independent thought about ethics to accept this notice in place of reading the book itself. The absence of an index is unfortunate.

A. W. S.

Les principes sociologiques du droit civil. Par RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE, Juge au tribunal de Nantes, Lauréat de l'Institut de France. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1906. Pp. 432. Fr. 10.

This is said to be the first important attempt to construct a sociology of the civil law, and it may be doubted whether the effort has been successful. The essayist in the present case has been a prolific contributor to the literature of civil sociology, one of his most notable contributions being *Les principes sociologiques de la criminologie*, published in 1901—an attempt to do for the criminal law what the present work aims to do for the civil law. To this science of civil sociology the author applies the term *civilologie*, corresponding to the term “criminology” in the sphere of the criminal law. The work is divided into two principal parts: pure sociology considered, first, from the point of view of the dynamics of the state, and, second, from the point of view of the state as a static body. A third and briefer part deals with the principal facts of applied civil sociology. Under the head of dynamic civil sociology M. Grasserie describes the evolution of civil-juridical sociology among different peoples, so far as there is a regular and uniform order discoverable. In the part which is devoted to the statics of civil sociology he treats of the nature and divisions of the science and its place among the other sciences; of the elements and pathology of a civil contract or obligation; of filiation, paternalism, and tutelage; of testaments, successions, and property; of the sociology of legal sanctions, civil procedure, and international private law. Applied civil sociology, he says, is nothing more than the science and the art of civil legislation (p. 414).

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